

On what has been said in Tagalog: Reportative *daw**

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1. Introduction

One of the main functions of human language is the exchange of information. Grammatical elements that indicate the source of information are called evidentiality markers (cf. Aikhenvald 2005). Their systematic study has begun only rather recently, and the analyses proposed differ considerably. But this seems to be faithful to the underlying facts: detailed investigation suggests that the encoding of information source differs considerably across languages. For anyone interested in questions of learnability, this should raise considerable worries. How many different mechanisms are employed by natural languages? Do they have anything in common? In this paper, I add a further language from a language family that has hitherto not received systematic study for encoding of evidentiality, namely the Austronesian language Tagalog. I will argue that it shows evidentiality marking which, even is syntactically realized by a particle, is semantically similar to the reportative modal *sollen* in German. I will first explain some basics about Tagalog grammar in general and with respect to evidentiality marking. I will then present the main types of evidentiality analyses currently available, and discuss in how far they are applicable to Tagalog. In the end, I will come up with a presuppositional analysis for Tagalog reportative *daw* which renders it similar to reportative strategies in Bulgarian and German in general (as presuppositional) and, in particular, to the German modal verb *sollen* (in terms of what is the actual semantic impact). Yet, the match is not perfect. I propose an analysis that is fine-grained enough to capture the remaining differences.

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2. A Brief Introduction to Tagalog

2.1 Tagalog in General

Tagalog is an Austronesian language spoken in the Northern part of the Philippines (central and southern Luzon, around Manila); together with English, it is the official language of the Republic of the Philippines. The vocabulary displays a strong Spanish influence, but nowadays English has the main impact. Noteworthy, there is a high acceptance of mixing English and Tagalog (known as Taglish).

Tagalog is a predicate-initial language, else, word-order is relatively free. Predicates can be verb phrases, adjective phrases, prepositional phrases, or noun phrases. Noun phrases in non-predicate position are preceded by ‘articles’ that mark them as nominative (*ang*), genitive (*ng*) and dative (*sa*), plural is marked by adding *mga* (cf. Kröger 1993).¹ Tagalog is well-studied for its rich verbal inflection. With Schachter and Otnes (1972), I assume that verbs are inflected for aspect, but not tense, and distinguish PERFECTIVE, IMPERFECTIVE, and CONTEMPLATED aspect. Moreover, we find infinitives (which are also used as the main verb in imperative clauses), as well as verbal roots (used in imperative clauses exclusively). Furthermore, the system opposes agent focused verbal forms (AGF), where it is the agent that carries the nominative marker, and various non-agent focused verbal forms (GOALF). In the latter case, depending on the verbal form, the nominative marked constituent can be the patient (object focus, OBJF), the location/indirect object (directional focus, DIRF), the beneficiary (BENF), etc. A particular element called linker *na/-ng* (Lk) marks agreement within a phrase or functions as a finite (declarative) or infinite complementizer.

2.2 Evidentiality in Tagalog

Tagalog does not have a fully grammaticalized evidential system. As in English, marking of evidential source is not obligatory. A plain declarative sentence involving any of the verbal forms does not carry any commitment as to how the information has been gained. It only commits the speaker to be convinced of the truth of what he is saying. The English dialogue in (1) can be translated directly as exemplified in (2-e). A’s opening statement in Tagalog is equally open to possible justifications as its English counterpart in (1).

- (1) A: Tina is at home, you can call her.
 B: How do you know?
 A: She told me she’d be there now./Magda told me she’d be there now./I just called her on the home phone./I can see her sit up there on the balcony./She’s usually at home at that time./...
- (2) A: Nasa bahay si Tina, puwede mo siyang tawagan.
 at home the Tina, can you.GEN she.NOM-LK call

¹These forms are used for common nouns exclusively. With proper nouns, we find *si/ni/kay* in the singular and *sina/nina/kina* in the plural. The status as case markers is highly controversial, but entirely irrelevant to my concern here.

‘Tina is at home, you can call her.’

B: Paano mo nalaman? - A:

- a. Sinabi kasi niya sa akin na nandoon siya ngayon.
say.OBJF-PFV because she.GEN to me LK was-there she.NOM today
- b. Sinabi kasi sa akin ni Magda na nandoon siya ngayon.
say.OBJF-PFV because to me.DAT the.GEN Magda LK was-there she today
- c. Tinawagan ko lang siya ngayon sa telepono.
call.DIRF-PFV me.GEN just she.NOM now on telephone
- d. Nakikita ko siya ngayon na naka-upo sa balkonahe.
see.OBJF-IMPV me.GEN she.NOM now LK get-seated.AGF-PFV on balcony
- e. Madalas na nasa bahay siya ng ganitong oras.
often LK in house she.NOM at these hours

The source of information was left unspecified in A’s original utterance, upon B’s request, A uses lexical material to specify what it was. But Tagalog also has a rich particle system (about 18, cf. Schachter and Otnes 1972, Bader, Werlen, and Wymann 1994), three of which are related to the marking of source of information. Tagalog particles usually occur in a designated position following the clause-initial predicate. As far as their semantics permits it, more of them can co-occur and their order is determined by phonological factors. The particles that relate to the source of information are the ‘reportative marker’ *daw*, as well as the ‘speculation markers’ *yata* (in statements) and *kaya* (in questions and imperatives; in statements, *kaya* means ‘therefore’). For Philippino languages in general, Aikhenvald (2005) cites Ballard (1974) who describes them as ‘reportative vs. rest’. This seems to single out the marker *daw* as indicating reportative evidence vs. non-*daw*-marked, non-reportative evidence. But that is too strong: as we have seen in (2-e), *daw* need not be used if the speaker relies on reportative evidence only, and, conversely, absence of *daw* does not indicate that the source for the expressed information is non-reportative in nature. Moreover, we will see a usage of *daw* that marks dependence on an operator of a certain type, and not that the proposition it modifies has been asserted by some reportative source or other. On first inspection, *kaya* and *yata* display interesting similarities with *daw*; all three particles and their interplay merit closer investigation, of course. But for the time being, I will confine my interest to *daw*. In particular, I will investigate how it compares to other reportative markers that have recently been studied in detail (e.g. Faller 2002, 2006, McCready and Ogata 2007, Sauerland and Schenner t.a.).

3. Reportative Particle *daw*

Like all other particles in Tagalog, *daw* occurs preferably in second position, following the predicate. After vowels, *daw* is normally realized as its allomorph *raw*. Semantically,

adding *daw* to a simple declarative sentence with propositional content ϕ expresses that ϕ has been asserted previously by some source x (henceforth, I will call such a ϕ the prejacent). The nature of x is to be determined by the context of utterance: it is often one of the arguments of the predicate, but it can also be any other salient individual;² If no particular individual is salient as a suitable source, it is often the general opinion that functions as the source.³

- (3) Darating daw si John.
 come.CONT daw the John
 ‘According to X , John will come.’
 $x = \text{subject}$: ‘John said he will come.’
 $x = \text{salient individual}$: ‘According to him/her/them, John will come.’
 $x = \text{general opinion}$: ‘It is generally said that John will come.’
 $x = \text{some individual}$: ‘Someone said that John will come.’

When using *daw*, the speaker can distance himself from the prejacent, endorse it, or remain entirely neutral. Only if *daw* is stressed, the neutral report is lost and the speaker expresses doubt as to the truth of the prejacent. In particular, unstressed *daw* is perfectly compatible

²The resolution of x to an overt argument is insensitive to what is realized as the nominative. In (i), if John or Maria are to be the source, this has to be made clear in the preceding context:

- (i) Tatawagan daw ni Maria si John.
 call.CONT-GOALF DAW the.GEN Maria the.NOM John
 ‘According to x , Mary will call John.’

The absence of a preference for the nominative is surprising given the connection between diathesis and information structure that is usually assumed for Tagalog. The issue merits further study.

³Examples like (i) require an indefinite reading which is reflected by the possibility of ‘ $x = \text{some individual}$ ’. I am indebted to Ede Zimmermann (p.c.) for bringing up the issue and to Philippe Schlenker (p.c.) for coming up with (i) as a test, which lead to the correction of an error in a previous version.

- (i) Darating daw si John, pero hindi ko alam kung sino ang nagsabi.
 come.CONT-AGF DAW the.NOM John but not my knowledge if who the.NOM say.PFV-AGF
 ‘Someone said that John will come, but I don’t know who it was who said it.’

More cases need to be considered to understand the exact status of the source x in such contexts of existential closure. It is clear though that a *daw*-modified sentence differs from an explicitly expressed existential quantification in information structure. Assume it is general knowledge that John dislikes Mary and would never go to her birthday party and that both A and B are well aware of this. B was at a party at Hong’s place. The following day, A meets B and asks ‘What happened at Hong’s party last night?’. B can reply (ii), but not (3).

- (ii) May nagsabi na darating daw si John sa birthday ni Maria next
 exists say.PFV-AGF LK come.CONT-AGF DAW the.NOM John to birthday the.GEN Maria next
 week.
 week
 ‘Someone said that John will go to Mary’s birthday party next week.’

In (3), the foregrounded part is about the future. Therefore, it cannot be used in reply to a question about what happened yesterday.

with the speaker having reliable evidence as to the truth value of the modified proposition, *daw* can e.g. be contrasted with another particle emphasizing the truth of the proposition it modifies (*nga* ‘indeed’):⁴

- (4) Si Vicky 40 years old daw, at 40 years old nga siya.
 the Vicky 40 years old DAW, and 40 years old indeed she
 ‘According to X, Vicky is 40 years old, and she is indeed 40 years old.’
 (*most likely*:) ‘Vicky says that she is 40 years old, and she is indeed 40 years!’

It is crucial that the source be third person. *daw* cannot be used to report an utterance by the speaker or the hearer:

- (5) A: Darating ako sa isang oras. - B (half an hour later): Kailan
 A: come.AGF-CONT I.NOM in one hour. - B: when
 ka {ulit, *daw} darating?
 you.NOM {again, *daw} come.AGF-CONT
 A: ‘I’ll come in an hour.’ - B (half an hour later, failing to remember): ‘What did you say when you’d come?’

Finally, *daw* can occur in complement clauses of report or attitude operators (verbs of saying, thinking, asking, ... adverbials like *according to x, ...*). Here, the most prominent reading is one under which *daw* does not make any semantic contribution. In these cases, it is optional.⁵

- (6) Ayon sa radyo bubuti daw ang panahon bago
 according to radio, get-better.AGF.CONT daw the.NOM weather before
 gumabi.
 get-night.AGF-INF
 ‘According to the radio, the weather will get better before tonight.’
- (7) Tinanong ng estudyante kung puwede daw niyang
 ask.OBJF.PFV the.GEN student if can DAW he.GEN-LK
 hiramín ang libro.
 borrow.OBJF-INF the.NOM book.
 (secretary to professor): ‘A student asked if he could borrow your book.’

The hypothesis that will be pursued in this paper is that all these usages of *daw* can be derived from a single lexical entry.

4. Comparing Approaches to Evidentiality

In the recent literature on evidentiality, we find three main types of analyses. This, however, does not constitute a matter of theoretical dispute, but pays respect to the fact that

⁴Note that the sentence is not predicate initial. Inversion is usually marked by *ay* between subject and predicate, but it can be omitted in informal speech.

⁵Alternative readings, under which *daw* is not optional, will be discussed in detail in section 6.2.

evidentiality markers differ cross-linguistically in various respects. The theoretical distinctions rely on what aspects are emphasized of the linguistic objects uttered in a discourse. For each distinction, we have to determine where a particular evidentiality marker makes its contribution, and what that contribution is.

Faller (2006) argues that the relevant distinction for evidentials in Cusco Quechua is the one of illocution (indication of a particular speech act type) vs. propositional content; cf. (8-a). In contrast, for Bulgarian (cf. Izvorski 1997, Sauerland and Schenner t.a.), German (cf. Fabricius-Hansen and Sæbø 2004, Schenner t.a.) and Japanese (cf. McCready and Asher 2006), it has been argued that the relevant distinction is the one between presupposed and asserted/questioned/commanded content (I follow Brasoveanu and Farkas 2007, who call the latter *at issue-content*); cf. (8-b). Finally, McCready and Ogata (2007) argue that the impact of Japanese evidentials should be captured in a dynamic logic that allows elements to modify the context change potential of a sentence in a particular way; cf. (8-c).

- (8) a. illocution (indicating speech act type) (propositional content)
 b. presupposition vs. Illocution (propositional content proper)
 c. context change potential

For Tagalog, I will argue that *daw* does not affect illocutionary force or context change potential directly, hence, it operates on the propositional level and belongs to the semantic object proper. Moreover, I will argue that *daw* is not part of the *at issue-content*, but triggers a particular presupposition.

5. Evidentials as Speech Act Modifiers

Faller (2002, 2006) argues that evidentials in Cusco Quechua do not contribute to the propositional content of an utterance. Rather, they modify the illocutionary force that is conventionally indicated by the sentence. In other words, evidential markers modify illocutionary operators. This results in modification of the sincerity condition of the speech act that can be accomplished with a linguistic object. The reportative evidential in Cusco Quechua modifies the commitment that is usually associated with an assertive operator, the result being as follows:⁶

- (9) The speaker's evidential commitment is that some speaker S_3 at some point said β from which α follows.

Let's see if this analysis carries over to Tagalog *daw*.

From what we have seen above (cf. (3)), it seems that the content of the modification is not inappropriate for *daw*. But we have to evaluate if the type of modification is suitable for explaining *daw*.

⁶Faller (2006) assumes that such rules operate on SDRT-representations in the sense of Asher and Lascarides (2003).

5.1 *daw* as an Illocutionary Modifier?

At first glance, it looks quite plausible that *daw* might indeed be an illocutionary modifier. Tagalog generally employs particles to express (or modify) illocutionary force. E.g. polar interrogative clauses are formed by adding the question particle *ba*, imperatives are softened with another particle *nga*. Moreover, *daw* meets one of Faller (2006)'s *sine qua non*-conditions for being a speech act modifier: *daw* has to scope out of (clause-mate) negation:

- (10) Hindi *daw* umuulan.
 not *daw* rain.AF-IMPFV
 'According to *x*, it's not raining.'
not: 'x doesn't/didn't say it's raining.'/'It's not the case that according to *x* it is/was raining.'

On closer examination, however, *daw* does not seem to be a modifier of illocutionary force. First, *daw* occurs in embedded sentences without taking wide scope; this is generally held impossible for illocutionary modifiers.⁷

- (11) Akala ni Tashi guro *daw* siya.
 opinion of Tashi teacher *daw* he
 'Tashi thinks he's a teacher.'
not: 'According to *x*, Tashi thinks he is a teacher.'

Second, if *daw* occurs in an embedded position, it does not outscope matrix clause negation. Note that such a sentence induces no requirement as to whether someone else has asserted the complement proposition.

- (12) Hindi sinabi ni Florian na nasa bahay *daw* si Magda.
 not say.OBJF-PFV the.Gen Florian LK in house *daw* the.GEN Magda
 'Florian didn't say that Magda was home.' (in fact, no-one said so/it was Tina, who said so)

Third, in contrast to what Faller (2006) observes for Cusco Quechua, in Tagalog, assent or dissent can target the evidentiality marker. Consider (13) in a scenario where B has just been on the telephone with Florian:

- (13) A: Ano ang sinabi ni Florian? . B: Nasa bahay *daw* si
 A: What the say.OBJF-PFV the.GEN Florian - B: in house *daw* the.NOM
 Magda. - C: Hindi totoo yun. Nasa bahay nga si Magda, pero hindi
 Magda - C: not true that. in house indeed the.NOM Magda, but not
 sinabi ni Florian.
 say.OBJF-PFV the.GEN Florian

⁷Note that *daw* is semantically vacuous on the preferred reading for these embedded occurrences. For a discussion of additional non-vacuous readings, cf. section (41).

A: 'What did Florian say?' - B: 'He said that Magda is at home.' - C: 'That's not true. Magda is at home indeed, but Florian didn't say so.'

Example (4) (repeated as (14)) shows that it is also possible to explicitly contrast *daw*-marked information with information modified by *nga* 'actually'. Normally, different illocutionary forces cannot be contrasted as such.

- (14) Si Vicky 40 years old daw, at 40 years old nga siya.
 the Vidky 40 years old DAW, and 40 years old indeed she
 'Vicky says that she is 40 years old, and she is 40 indeed!'
 (*literally*: 'According to X, Vicky is 40 years old, and she is indeed 40 years old.')

Fourth, illocutionary operators (or operators on illocutionary force) cannot usually come on their own, e.g. (15). In contrast, *daw* can. In such cases, it indicates correction or weakening of the propositional content asserted in the preceding utterance, cf. (16).

- (15) A: Maaaring bumalik si John. - B: #Ba?
 A: might come-back.INF the.NOM John. - B: INT-PART
 ('A: John might come back.' - intended: 'B: Will he?')
- (16) A: Darating si John. - B: Daw. (with B = A or B ≠ A)
 come.CONTEMPLATED the John. - DAW
 'A: John will come. - A: Or, so he says./B: That's what he says.'

I take these issues to constitute strong evidence that *daw* is not a modifier of illocutionary force. We can now proceed to test the behaviour of *daw* in relation to other operators related to illocutionary force. Even if the results are not as clear-cut as we might wish them to be, they support the hypothesis that *daw* is not an illocutionary modifier.

5.2 *daw* in Imperatives

Crosslinguistically, it is extremely rare for evidential markers to occur in imperatives. As exceptions Aikhenvald (2005) mentions Tariana, Northern Embera, Shipibo-Konibo and West Greenlandic.⁸ All these languages have in common that the imperative containing a reportative marker constitutes not the report of someone else's command, but is rather a genuine command itself, which is backed by the will (implicit or explicit) of a third party. In some cases, it is also that third party who takes responsibility for the command/request... performed by the actual speaker.

Things are different in Tagalog. Here, too, we observe the rare case of a reportative marker occurring in an imperative clause. Yet, the result is not an imperative on behalf of a third party, but rather an entirely neutral report of an imperative that has been issued by

⁸Tariana has a particular second-hand imperative form for commands that are motivated by the requests of a third party, cf. Aikhenvald (2003). Quiang, a Sino-Tibetan language, does not allow for its reportative marker to occur in commands, but adds the verb of saying to imperatives to achieve the same effect, cf. LaPolla (2003). Cf. Valenzuela (2003) for Shipibo-Konibo, a Panoan language spoken in the Peruvian Amazon.

a third party. As a mere report, it imposes no obligation on the addressee to fulfill what is reported to be requested, nor to get the recipient of the original imperative to do so.

In general, imperative clauses in Tagalog are described as containing either infinitives or verbal roots.⁹ Both form types share the variety of usages observed for German or English imperatives and, again like those, do not render accessible a truth value:¹⁰

- (17) A: Kumain/Kain (ka)! - B: #Hindi totoo!
 eat.AGF.INF/eat.VROOT (you)! - not true
 A: ‘Eat!’ - B: ‘That’s not true.’

Adding *daw* turns the imperative into a report of someone else’s imperative:

- (18) Kumain/Kain (ka) daw.
 eat.INF/eat.VROOT (you) DAW
 e.g.: ‘Mommy/They/... said that you should eat.’

Being a mere report (18) can be countered by *Hindi totoo!* ‘That’s not true!’. In this case, the only source of disagreement is the reportative component, that is, it means ‘that person did not say so’.

Now, the issue is partly resolved, and partly rendered more complicated, by another peculiarity of Tagalog imperatives that has gone unnoticed so far. In contrast to what is the case in most other languages (cf. Schwager 2005, for discussion), at least imperatives formed from infinitives can occur in embedded position. Imperatives formed from verbal roots are judged as somewhat less felicitous, but not as ungrammatical. A possible explanation for the contrast in acceptability is that verbal root imperatives are generally felt to be highly informal, which might clash with the somewhat more formal embedding constructions.

- (19) Sa huli, sinabi ni Tina na kumain/??kain na (daw)
 at recent say.OBJF.PFV the.GEN Tina LK eat.AGF.INF/eat.VROOT now (DAW)
 si Joao.
 the.NOM Joao
 ‘Recently, Tina said to Joao that he should eat.’

Now, if imperative clauses can occur embedded under ordinary propositional operators in general, it is not surprising to find them modified by reportative *daw* as well.

5.3 *daw* in Interrogatives

Evidential markers inherently depend on the evidential perspective of some agent (the evidential *origo*). The evidential perspective relevant for declaratives is normally the speaker. In contrast, evidential markers in interrogatives are often related to the hearer’s evidential perspective. They specify the body of information w.r.t. which the question should

⁹Certain denominal verbs do not form root imperatives, cf. Račkov (2001).

¹⁰Cf. e.g. Schwager (2005) for a general discussion of imperatives.

be answered. In short, assertions are normally about what the speaker knows (evidential origo = speaker), whereas questions are usually about what the hearer knows (evidential origo = hearer). This phenomenon is known as *evidential flip* (cf. Faller 2006).

For Cusco Quechua, Faller (2006) observes that the evidential shift is optional. She argues that, in either case, the evidential marker outscopes the interrogative marker. In the following, I will compare her observations to the situation in Tagalog.

Faller describes the case of evidential flip in Cusco Quechua as in (20-a); she argues that this constitutes a reportative evidential outscoping an interrogative. I find this hard to tell apart from the inverse scope which could be described as in (20-b).

- (20) a. REP > INT: "According to reportative evidence you have,
what x is s.t. $\phi(x)$?"
 b. INT > REP: "What x is such that you have reportative evidence that $\phi(x)$?"

Cases of evidential flip can easily be found in Tagalog. Yet these examples seem to instantiate the scopal order of "Int > daw". The reportative information is taken to be part of what has been asked. It seems weird to reply with "I don't need to rely on hearsay because I actually know what the facts are:..."¹¹

- (21) Bakit naman daw ikaw ang tinext niya?
 why now DAW you the textOBJF-PFV sheGEN
 'What reasons did she give for texting you?'
 (*literally*: 'What were the reasons such that x said it was for these reasons that she texted you?')

The context of occurrence¹² disambiguates the sentence in favor of the reading in (21).

- (22) "Naghiwalay na ata sila ng boyfriend niya. Nagtext siya sa kin kagabi kung pwede daw kaming magkwentuhan. Di pumunta ako. Parang wala naman kaming pinagsamahan kung di ako pupunta, di ba?" - "Sa bagay. *Bakit naman daw ikaw ang tinext niya?* Wala ba siyang ibang matext?
 "She and her boyfriend, they probably broke up. She texted me last night if we could talk to each other. So I went. It would seem that we were not friends if I didn't go, right?" - "Well, yeah. *What reasons did she give for texting you?* Doesn't she have someone else to text to?"

As an example for a question without evidential flip (the speaker remains the evidential origo), Faller (2006) cites the dialogue in (23-b) (her example (27)). Here, the scopal relations are clearly of the type "REP > INT", which means that "I have reportative evidence that third person asked ϕ ". But as a paraphrase, this is still too weak: Faller describes such cases as "asking a question on someone else's behalf" and reports the following interaction with her consultant (=C)'s mother in law, who is hard of hearing:

¹¹Note that, syntactically, we do not expect an ambiguity of whether the *wh*-element modifies the saying or the texting: the reportative part does not contain a trace position for the *wh*-element *bakit* 'why', hence, it can only modify the texting.

¹²<http://www.peyups.com/article.khtml?sid=4357>

- (23) a. MF: Imayna-n ka-sha-nki.
 how-BPG be-PROG-2
 ‘How are you?’
 b. C: Imayna-s ka-sha-nki.
 how-REP be-PROG-2
 ‘(She says) how are you?’
- Cusco Quechua

If the exchange is translated to Tagalog using *daw*, we lose the notion that C is asking a question ‘on behalf of A’:

- (24) A: Kumusta ka?
 How-are you?
 B: Pardon?
 C: Kumusta ka raw!
 how-are you daw!
 ‘She asks how you are.’

In Tagalog, the scopal relation “REP > INT” without evidential flip does not amount to asking a question on behalf on someone else, but constitutes a report of a previous question. In (25), I give an example from a context that disambiguates the sentence in favor of that particular scopal order, cf. (26).¹³ In this case, we can also see that such cases are not quotational, since the indexicals have shifted (consider *me*). This reading of (25) is best analyzed as an instance of free indirect speech as familiar from English or German.

- (25) Bakit daw hindi ko siya tinawagan.
 why DAW not me she call.DIRF-PFV
 ‘(She asked) why I didn’t call her.’
- (26) B: “Ano naman kwinento sa iyo?” - A: “Birthday niya kasi nung December. *Bakit daw hindi ko siya tinawagan.* Hindi ko rin daw siya niregaluhan noong pasko. Hindi ko nga siya maintindihan kasi hindi naman niya ako boyfriend.”
 B: “So what did she tell you?” - A: “(It’s) because her birthday was in December. *She asked why didn’t I call her,* and that I hadn’t given her a Christmas present either. I don’t understand her because Im not her boyfriend anymore.”

5.4 Summing up: Interaction with other Operators

The interaction of *daw* with other operators can be summed up as follows: *daw* can shift assertions, questions, and commands to reports of speech acts of the same type. In either case, the speaker remains the evidential origo, and the resulting speech act is an assertion that some other speech act has taken place. It is only for questions that we find the alternative possibility that the original illocutionary force is retained, hence, the modified sentence still constitutes an interrogative and is used to ask a question. Only in this case,

¹³<http://www.peyups.com/article.khtml?sid=4357>

the evidential flip occurs and the hearer becomes the evidential origo.

assertion	→	report of an assertion
question	→	report of a question
	↘	question about what has been said
command	→	report of a command

I take this to indicate that *daw* can indeed affect illocutionary force. Nevertheless, it does not modify the impact of a particular illocutionary operator, but shifts the modified sentence to its corresponding indirect counterpart. If *daw* were to be treated as a modifier of illocutionary force, it would have to constitute a rule like (27):

- (27) For any semantic object ϕ that is associated with speech act α by default, '*daw* ϕ ' is associated with speech act REPORT. The evidential commitment a speaker undertakes with REPORT(DAW ϕ) is that at some point some speaker S_3 performed $\alpha(\phi)$.

But (27) does not take care of the interrogatives with evidential flip (as evidenced by (22)). For that case we would need an alternative rule like (28):

- (28) To '*daw* ϕ ?' assign QUESTION'(ϕ) where QUESTION' is QUESTION with the evidential basis shifted to what has been asserted by some speaker S_3 .

The ambiguity for *daw*-modified main clause interrogatives is genuine, the rules are not weighted w.r.t. each other. Moreover, there is no systematic connection between the two rules, and it is unclear why a rule analogous to (28) is absent for imperatives (for assertions, a report of someone else's assertion seems impossible to tell apart from a statement based on what someone else has asserted). It should give rise to effects as observed for Tariana and other languages (cf. above).

For these reasons, and in view of the evidence discussed in section 5.1 against a treatment of *daw* as an illocutionary modifier, I will resort to a treatment along the following lines: *daw* does not modify illocutionary force, but it introduces information at a lower, propositional level. Yet, it does not contribute to the at-issue content (e.g., what is asserted), but introduces a presupposition. In embedded cases, the presupposition is often satisfied (bound) by the matrix clause. If *daw* occurs in a main clause, the prejacent ends up as embedded under the description of a contextually salient or accommodated previous utterance event with that content. I will argue further that *daw* in an interrogative with evidential flip (e.g. (25)) is an instance of genuine wide scope of the interrogative operator. Now, why don't we find this type of scope reversal with imperatives? Simply, because the embedded proposition would have to be a description of some past speech act event, roughly 'Make it the case that: x said that ϕ '. But of course, this is not something the hearer could influence. If the reportative component is treated as presuppositional (cf. section 7), given that the resolution of presuppositions is subject to pragmatic considerations, such a reading is excluded as inherently non-sensical.

6. Evidentials as Part of the Semantic Object Proper

In contrast to Cusco Quechua, for a couple of languages it has been shown convincingly that their evidential markers do not modify illocutionary force. This holds in particular for Japanese (cf. McCready and Asher 2006, McCready and Ogata 2007) and Bulgarian (cf. Izvorski 1997, Sauerland and Schenner t.a.). Still there is general hesitation to treat the respective elements at the propositional level proper, that is, as at issue-content. The main arguments are the following: first, there is a general resistance against embedding under negation (but cf. McCready and Ogata 2007, for embedding under higher negation). Second, often, if the markers can occur below an attitude operator, the evidential information should not be repeated as part of the complement proposition (e.g. Sauerland and Schenner t.a. against Izvorski 1997). In contrast, if the marker occurs in the matrix clause, only the thus modified proposition should be asserted, and there is no commitment with respect to the underlying proposition to be true (but compare Bulgarian, section (31)). We have already seen that the latter holds true for Tagalog as well. That is, we seek to capture the following behaviour: (29-a) does not commit the speaker to the fact that it is raining, but only to the fact that some source *x* said so. In contrast, (29-b) commits the speaker to the truth of the proposition that Pedro has said that it is raining - not to the proposition that Pedro has said that according to some *x* (or according to himself) it was raining.

- (29) a. Umuulan daw.
 raining DAW
 ‘According to *x*, it is raining.’
 b. Sinabi ni Pedro na umuulan daw.
 said-GF.PFV the.GEN Pedro Lk rain.IMPV DAW
 strongly preferred: ‘Pedro said that it was raining.’

In short, when occurring in a matrix clause, *daw* makes a crucial contribution to the information expressed; when occurring in an embedded clause of the right kind, *daw* is mostly treated as vacuous. In the following, I will compare a few approaches to evidential markers that do not modify the illocution, and I will evaluate if any of them is apt in content and type of modification to account for the facts in Tagalog.

6.1 Reportative Markers in Dynamic Modal Logic

If evidential markers were to introduce presuppositions, we would expect them to confirm to the quite well-studied behaviour of presupposition projection. McCready and Ogata (2007) argue that the evidential impact of Japanese modals does not confirm to the usual pattern of presupposition projection. Therefore they depart from the presuppositional proposal by McCready and Asher (2006), and develop a new solution in terms of dynamic modal logic. As always in dynamic semantics, semantic objects denote relations between information states. Moreover, their proposal is irreducibly dynamic: some semantic objects are assigned an impact on an information state that cannot be described in terms of eliminating all those points (possible worlds) at which the classical proposition is not true.

In contrast, the framework allows for a linguistic object uttered in discourse to change the subjective probabilities assigned to its truth by the hearer, and to model the degree of conviction on the side of the speaker.

Although the proposal is very interesting in itself and looks very promising for Japanese evidentials, it does not provide us with a good handle on Tagalog evidentials. *daw* does not convey any information as to the degree of conviction the speaker holds with respect to the underlying proposition. In that, it is exactly like the Japanese hearsay evidential *sooda* + ϕ_{st} (reportative), which McCready and Ogata (2007) analyze as in (30).

- (30) $H_a^i \phi$ is a test on elements in an information state that passes them on if there is a past time at which the agent a experienced a hearsay event of ϕ with index i , else, they are eliminated.¹⁴

It is now easy to see that this cannot be applied to *daw*: it works well for matrix declaratives (although we would need to add a stipulation against narrow scope with respect to clause mate negation), but it makes incorrect predictions with respect to embedded *daw*: there, the reportative meaning would, incorrectly, be added to the embedded proposition. While McCready and Ogata (2007)'s framework allows for binding into the hearsay operator (in the sense of specifying the source a), it does not allow to bind the hearsay operator H itself by a higher *verbum dicendi*. Hence, the framework does not offer any new insights into our problem.

6.2 Reportative Markers between Presupposition and Assertion

I will now take a closer look at reportative markers in a few languages that have rather recently received detailed analysis in terms of a split between *at issue*-content and presupposed content. In particular, I will compare *daw* to evidential modals in Japanese (cf. McCready and Asher 2006), to the reportative mood marker in Bulgarian (cf. Izvorski 1997, Sauerland and Schenner t.a.), as well as to the modal verb *sollen* (cf. Schenner t.a.) and to the reportative subjunctive marker in German (cf. Schlenker 2003, von Stechow 2003, Fabricius-Hansen and Sæbø 2004). I will show that, semantically, *daw* is highly similar to German *sollen* and that a version of Fabricius-Hansen and Sæbø (2004)'s proposal (intended for the German reportative subjunctive) makes the correct predictions for *daw*.

Weak Assertion in Japanese

McCready and Asher (2006) advocate a presuppositional treatment for the Japanese reportative marker *soo-da* + p_{st} . According to them, it comes with the *at issue*-content and the presuppositional meaning component in (31):

¹⁴I depart from McCready and Ogata (2007)'s usage of the term *information state*. When they speak of hearsay evidentials as constituting 'tests on information states', this is not intended in the sense of Veltman (1996). The reason is simply that, for McCready and Ogata (2007), 'information state' means point within an information state in the more standard understanding of Veltman.

- (31) *at issue*: there is some individual who believes *p*
presupposition: the speaker has hearsay evidence for *p*

While the predictions are considered largely accurate for Japanese (apart from the non-standard projection behaviour which motivates the alternative account in McCready and Ogata (2007), cf. section 6.1), the proposal would make grossly incorrect predictions for Tagalog *daw*. In the matrix case, the assertion is too strong (it may be known that not even the person who originally uttered the proposition believed it). In the embedded case, the assertive part is in the way (there is no report with respect to an utterance of someone believing *p*), moreover, the presupposition is too strong. E.g. in the case of a negated *verbum dicendi*, no hearsay evidence for *p* is presupposed (cf. (12)).

(No) Modals for the Bulgarian Reportative

Besides a direct and a dubitative verbal evidential marker, Bulgarian possesses also a reportative verbal marker, henceforth *Bul_{Rep}*. Izvorski (1997) analyzes it as an epistemic modal much like English *must*. Yet, *Bul_{Rep}* differs from English *must* in adducing an additional presupposition that the speaker has indirect evidence for her claim of the resulting modal proposition. The same contrast holds between *must* vs. *apparently* as two expressions of epistemic necessity in English.

- (32) Knowing how much John likes wine...
 a. ... he must have drunk all the wine yesterday.
 b. #... he apparently drank all the wine yesterday.

For *Bul_{Rep}*, Izvorski (1997) adopts the interpretation in (33):

- (33) The Interpretation of *Bul_{Rep}(p)*:
at issue: *p* is necessary in view of the speaker's knowledge state
presupposition: the speaker has indirect evidence for *p*

Even if Tagalog *daw* shares the requirement that there is a (particular) body of evidence for the thus modified proposition, the analysis does not carry over: already the plain matrix usages would come out wrong. For *daw*, the presupposed content is much too weak, given that not any kind of indirect evidence is allowed, and in particular, that existential quantification over the reportative source is disallowed (cf. the discussion of (3)). The at issue-content is inadequate, since *daw* is entirely neutral as to whether the speaker believes or disbelieves the modified proposition.¹⁵

¹⁵If anything, we should try another necessity modal as the at issue-part of *daw*'s meaning, resulting in something like (i), modelled along the lines of Izvorski (1997)'s proposal.

- (i) *at issue*: *p* is necessary in view of background *P* and *P* is the saying/thinking of *x*
presupposition: *x* is some contextually salient agent

As it stands, this still fails to explain the interpretation of *daw* in emedded position where it appears to be semantically vacuous. A theory of modal concord or modal underspecification might get this right. In addition,

Sauerland and Schenner (t.a.) show that, thanks to the assertive modal component, Izvorski (1997)'s analysis makes incorrect predictions for embedded occurrences of Bulgarian *Bul_{Rep}*. A modal analysis would predict *Bul_{Rep}* to shift: embedded epistemic modals like (34) express necessity with respect to the matrix subject, not with respect to the speaker.

(34) John thinks that it must be raining.

This makes wrong predictions for Bulgarian, because evidential markers do not shift. If the speaker has direct evidence, but the matrix subject has indirect evidence, the clause has to be marked with the direct marker, the reportative marker is unacceptable. Sauerland and Schenner (t.a.) test this in the following scenario:

(35) Milena told Maria that Todor has red hair and Maria believes her. Maria says 'Todor has.REP red hair'. I saw Todor's red hair with my own eyes and assert:

- a. Maria kaza če Todor {^{ok}ima/*imal} červena kosa.
 Maria said that Todor {^{ok}has.DIR/*has.REP} red hair

Hence, the evidential origo of an evidentiality marker in Bulgarian declaratives is the speaker, no matter how deeply embedded it occurs. In the same situation, (36) is fully felicitous. So, obviously, *daw* is unlike *Bul_{Rep}* in that respect.

(36) Sinabi ni Maria na pula daw ang buhok ni Todor.
 say.PFV-OBJF the.GEN Maria LK red DAW the.NOM hair the.GEN Todor
 'Maria said that Todor has red hair.'

At first glance, we might take this as an indication that *daw* is unlike *Bul_{Rep}* in that it shifts in embedded contexts. But we have already seen that *daw* is compatible with the evidential origo having perfect information in addition to reportative information (cf. (4)). Analogously, (36) is felicitous if both I (the speaker), and Maria have seen Todor's red hair with our own eyes.

For Bulgarian, further problems arise because the modal at-issue content should not appear embedded under the saying. Izvorski (1997) predicts (35-a) to mean (37-b) instead of its actual meaning (37-a).

- (37) a. Maria said that Todor has red hair (and I have heard that Todor has red hair).
 b. Maria said that I know that Todor has red hair.

On the basis of these criticisms, Sauerland and Schenner (t.a.) propose an alternative solution to capture reportative markers in embedded and unembedded cases, as well as in their interaction with the dubitative marker (only in embedded cases). The latter phenomenon forces them to assume an ambiguity of *Bul_{Rep}*. Given that Bulgarian and Tagalog differ with respect to how evidential origo is treated in embedded cases (e.g. (35-a) vs. (36)), it is not surprising that neither of the two entries captures the meaning of *daw*.

one has to be careful as *daw* is not closed under logical inferences. I leave it to further research to spell out a modal analysis for presuppositional elements like *daw* as an alternative to what I propose in section 7.

For the simple reportative marker, Sauerland and Schenner (t.a.) propose the meaning components in (38-a) and back it with the Binding Condition in (38-b).

- (38) a. $[[\text{REP}(y, v)(p)]]$
at issue: p
presupposition: y has in v reportative evidence for p
- b. *Binding Condition:*
 The arguments of REP y and v must be bound by the context operators of the matrix clause (= Bul_{Rep} does not shift).

It is immediately clear that, even for *daw* in matrix sentences, this could not be the right analysis. In analogy to Cusco Quechua and Japanese, it is perfectly possible to assert " ϕ -REP & $\neg\phi$ " without contradiction. '*daw* ϕ ' does not commit the speaker to the prejacent ϕ .

- (39) Dadating #(daw) siya sa isang oras, pero hindi talaga.
 will-come DAW he in one hour, but not really
 'He #(says he) will come in an hour, but in fact he won't.'
literally: 'According to X, (s)he will come in an hour, but in fact (s)he won't.'

Sauerland and Schenner (t.a.) show that the analogous conjunction is contradictory in Bulgarian, and this is exactly what their semantics in (38-a) predicts thanks to the strong assertive meaning.

For embedded cases, the assertive meaning component fits Tagalog just as well as it fits Bulgarian. But here, the presuppositional meaning component makes unwanted predictions. As observed in section 5.1, (12) (repeated as (40)) can be uttered in a scenario which is entirely neutral as to whether the speaker has reportative evidence from someone other than Florian with respect to whether I am at home or not.¹⁶

- (40) Hindi sinabi ni Florian na nasa bahay daw si Magda.
 not say.OBJF-PFV the.Gen Florian LK in house daw the.GEN Magda
 'Florian didn't say that Magda was home.' (in fact, no-one said so/it was Tina, who said so)

This problem will be solved if we give up the general presupposition of 'the speaker has reportative evidence' in favor of something more specific with respect to the source.

Sauerland and Schenner (t.a.)'s second entry for Bul_{Rep} , which is needed to capture the semantics of the reportative marker in when combined with the dubitative marker (occurring in the scopal order of $Bul_{Rep}(\text{DUB}(p))$), is given in (41).¹⁷

¹⁶Therefore, even if the presupposition can be accommodated flexibly, we do not obtain the right result. (40) entails neither that (i) the speaker has reportative evidence that Magda is at home (global accommodation), nor that (ii) the speaker does not have reportative evidence that Magda is at home (accommodation below *not*), nor does the entire sentence mean (iii) the same as *Florian did not say that Magda is at home and that I do not have reportative evidence for this*. (local accommodation).

¹⁷Sauerland and Schenner (t.a.) point out that the ambiguity is always resolved correctly if trivially true or inconsistent results are to be avoided.

- (41) $[[\text{REP}_a]](y, v)(p)$
at issue: y has in v indirect evidence for p
presupposition: -

Of course, this cannot be the meaning of *daw*, either: it is obvious that the *at issue*-content would make completely incorrect predictions in the embedded case.

Reportative Marking in German

The two main grammatical strategies of reportative marking in German are modal verbs (*sollen*¹⁸, in particular) and the reportative subjunctive (GRS). Two recent analyses (Fabricius-Hansen and Sæbø (2004) for the GRS; Schenner (t.a.) for *sollen*), argue that these elements induce a presupposition that the prejacent has been asserted (in case of a declarative) or asked (in case of an interrogative) prior to the current utterance. In the following, I will show that *daw* behaves just like *sollen* in declaratives (main clauses as well as subordinate clauses), but when taking into account interrogatives, *daw* and *sollen* part company. I will argue that, first, *daw* and *sollen* have to be distinguished from the GRS in terms of what I call *strong vs. weak reportativity*. Second, the difference between *daw* and *sollen* in interrogatives reduces to different flexibility in logical type. I briefly sketch an account for *daw* that relies on utterance events (argued for on independent grounds by Brasoveanu and Farkas 2007) and an idea from Schenner (t.a.).

In main clause declaratives, *sollen* and *daw* behave alike, and the GRS behaves differently. *daw* and *sollen* can be interpreted as saying that some third person, a particular contextually salient individual or people in general have claimed the prejacent.¹⁹ The German reportative subjunctive differs from the other two elements in only allowing an interpretation of free indirect speech.

- (42) Anna soll in Oslo sein.
 Anna should in Oslo be.
 ‘According to x , Anna is in Oslo.’
 ‘It is generally said that Anna is in Oslo.’
 ‘Someone said that Anna is in Oslo.’
- (43) Nasa Oslo daw si Anna.
 in Oslo DAW theNOM Anna
 ‘According to x , Anna is in Oslo.’
 ‘It is generally said that Anna is in Oslo.’
not: ‘Someone said that Anna is in Oslo.’

¹⁸Throughout, I ignore its alternative deontic reading.

¹⁹Note that there is a difference w.r.t. the person parameter: in Tagalog, any individual that is neither the speaker nor the hearer can be the agent of the previous utterance, in particular, the subject is a highly probable choice. The latter is excluded for *sollen*. (42) cannot mean ‘Anna claims to be in Oslo.’; but (43) can. In German, this is the only reading we get when *sollen* is replaced by *wollen*. Another issue that is ignored for the moment is the fact that, at least for *sollen*, the evidential source may not be known to have withdrawn his/her claim.

- (44) Anna sei in Oslo.
 Anna beREPSUBJ in Oslo
 ‘And, according to *x*, Anna is in Oslo.’
not: ‘It is generally said that Anna is in Oslo.’
not: ‘Someone said that Anna is in Oslo.’

In embedded clauses, *daw* and *sollen* behave alike, too. They allow the same range of readings: in both cases, the preferred construal is what SchennerSUB calls the concord interpretation, cf. German (45-a) and Tagalog (6) (repeated as (45-b)). On this reading, the reportative marker does not contribute anything and is also optional in both languages.

- (45) a. Die Zeitung hatte fälschlicherweise behauptet, daß sich die Prinzessin ihren Adelstitel unredlich erworben haben soll.
 ‘The newspaper had wrongly claimed that the princess gained her peerage dishonestly.’
 b. Ayon sa radyo bubuti daw ang panahon bago gumabi.
 according to radio, get-better.AGF.CONT daw the.NOM weather before get-night.AGF.INF
 ‘According to the radio, the weather will get better before tonight.’

Second, there is a local interpretation on which the reportative component is added below the matrix operator and embeds the proposition it modifies.²⁰ Example (46-a) is like (46-b). Such readings arise more easily if the concord reading is excluded for some reason or other (e.g. in Tagalog if the embedding predicate is first or second person).²¹

- (46) a. Ich weiß, dass Anna in Oslo sein soll.
 I know that *it is said* that Anna is in Oslo.
 b. Aalam akong nasa Oslo daw si Anna.
 know I-LK in Oslo DAW the.NOM Anna
 ‘I know that Anna is said to be in Oslo.’

Finally, there is what I will call the global interpretation. Here, the reportative content is not part of the attitude complement, but is predicated of the content independently.

- (47) a. Daß Legrenzi sein Lehrer gewesen werden soll, ist unwahrscheinlich.

²⁰Schenner calls this the *assertive* interpretation

²¹Syntactic facts also seem to play a role.

- (i) May ilang estudyante P1 na nagsabi na darating P2 sila.
 exists some student LK say.AF-PFV LK come.AF-CONT they
 ‘Some students said they would come.’
 a. *daw* in P1 (amb.): ‘Allegedly, some students said they would come.’
 ‘Some students said they would come.’
 b. *daw* in P2 (unamb.): only ‘Some students said they would come.’

This seems related to clitic climbing, which leads to argument pronouns from embedded clauses to appear in the particle slot of the higher clause, cf. Kröger (1993).

- ‘That Legrenzi had been his teacher (*as it is allged*), is unlikely.’
- b. Hindi marahil na naging guro daw niya si Legrenzi.
not probable LK was teacher DAW his the.NOM Legrenzi

The GRS is different: clearly, it has a concord reading:

- (48) Maria behauptet, dass Anna in Oslo sei.
‘Maria claims that Anna is in Oslo.’

Contexts that trigger a local reading for *sollen* result in ungrammaticality when we replace it with the GRS (cf. (46-a) vs. (49)), so obviously, the GRS does not allow for a local reading.

- (49) *Ich weiß, dass Anna in Oslo sei.
I know that Anna in Oslo be.GRS

Fabricius-Hansen and Sæbø (2004) argue that it does have a global reading in addition and adduce examples like (50).

- (50) Er dementierte nicht, Geishas für Liebesbeziehungen bezahlt zu haben, **bestritt**
he disclaimed not geishas for love-relations paid to have denied
aber, dass das unmoralisch sei.
however that that immoral be.GRS
‘He didn’t deny that he had paid geishas for love relations, but he did deny that that was immoral.’

Indeed, if the GRS contributes a presupposition that some *x* said/asserted *p* previously, this cannot constitute a concord interpretation: a denial of the prejacent ‘it is immoral to pay geishas for love-relations’ is clearly not an assertion of that proposition. Nevertheless, denying something presupposes that someone has previously asserted it. Hence, *deny* presupposes a previous utterance that can at the same time globally satisfy the presupposition of the GRS.²² Yet, I do not think that this is the correct analysis. Consider (51). Again, the matrix predicate *it is improbable* does not allow for a concord interpretation, and the previous context assures that the presupposition attributed to the GRS is satisfied globally. Still, the sequence is unacceptable. Hence, I conclude that the GRS does not have a global reading.

- (51) (Hans hat gestern behauptet, dass Legrenzi sein Lehrer gewesen sein soll.) #Es ist jedoch höchst unwahrscheinlich, dass Legrenzi sein Lehrer gewesen sei.
(Hans has claimed yesterday, that Legrenzi was his teacher.) Yet, it is highly improbable that Legrenzi wasREPSUBJ his teacher.

But how do we account for the apparent global interpretation in (50)? I would like to argue that we have to resort to an entirely different analysis of the GRS. Schlenker (2003) and von Stechow (2003) claim that the German subjunctive is a logophoric mood. As such,

²²The same goes for verbs like *hören* ‘hear’.

it requires binding by a higher attitude operator. Independently of how the analysis is spelt out in detail, it is assumed that the world variable is marked (syntactically or semantically) as obligatorily bound by the closest attitude operator, requiring e.g. a feature [+log] and a structure like (53).

(52) [+log]: has to be bound by an attitude operator *P*

(53) Jon said he *daw* come to the party.
 $w_1 t_1$ Jon say $\lambda w_2 \lambda t_2 \lambda x_2$ [$x_2^{[+3p]}$ $w_2^{[+log]}$ t_2 come to the party]

Crucially, there is no presupposition of ‘some *x* said *p*’ which could be accommodated locally or globally; if the binding is established as required, the result looks just like the concord interpretation as long as a concord interpretation is possible. The difference becomes apparent with matrix predicates that do not allow for a concord interpretation: as long as they are attitude operators, their propositional complement counts as bound by an attitude operator, and the GRS is licensed, although a concord interpretation is not available. In contrast, if the matrix predicate is not an attitude operator (e.g. *it’s improbable*), the GRS is ungrammatical and *daw* and *sollen* receive a local or global interpretation.

This difference amounts to a distinction of two types of reportative markers, which I will call strong and weak reportativity. Weak reportativity is just modal logophoricity: the element requires binding by an attitude operator.²³ Strong reportativity consists in the introduction of a presupposition of the sort ‘some *x* said/asked/asserted *p*’. The difference between *daw* and *sollen* on the one hand, and the GRS on the other hand, falls out from the fact that the former are strongly reportative, whereas the latter is weakly reportative.

But there are also important differences between *daw* and *sollen*. Consider embedded interrogatives. Schenner (t.a.) observes that in German, indirect questions trigger the local reading, cf. (54). But in fact, the concord reading is unavailable at all.²⁴

(54) Anna fragte, ob Charly zur Party kommen soll.
 ‘Anna asked whether it is said that Charly is coming to the party.’

In Tagalog, interrogative predicates behave like their assertive counterparts in that both local and concord construal are available:²⁵

(55) Nagtanong si Anna, kung dadating daw sa party si
 ask.AGF-COMPL the.NOM Anna if come.AGF-IMPV DAW to party the
 Charly.
 Charly
 R_a : ‘Anna asked if Charly was coming to the party.’
 R_b : ‘Anna asked if it was said that Charly was to the party.’

²³Note that there is a certain flexibility as to what counts as an attitude operator.

²⁴For the moment, I ignore the global reading which may be hard to get for independent reasons.

²⁵As always, the the embedding is also grammatical without *daw*. In that case, only R_a survives.

Second, *daw* and *sollen* differ in their interaction with other illocutionary operators.²⁶ We cannot compare them w.r.t. imperatives, because Tagalog and German already differ in the possibility of whether imperatives can be embedded at all. In section 5.2, I have suggested that the behaviour of *daw* in imperatives relies crucially on the fact that Tagalog imperatives can occur in embedded positions. German imperatives cannot occur in embedded positions, and, similarly, they cannot be modified by the modal verb *sollen*. But *daw* and *sollen* are comparable and differ in their interaction with interrogative marking. In section 5.3, we have established that sentences like (57-a) are ambiguous between interpretation as a main clause question and a free indirect speech reading that reports a question. In contrast, (57-b) does not allow for a free indirect speech interpretation.²⁷ The two readings we have to distinguish are the following:

- (56) a. [Int₁ > Rep > [...t₁...]] R₁
 b. [Rep > Int₁ > [...t₁...]] R₂, free indirect speech
- (57) a. Bakit ko ba daw napiling magsulat?
 ‘What did x give as reasons why I had chosen to write?’ R₁
 ‘(x asked) Why had I chosen to write.’ R₂
- b. Warum soll ich zu schreiben angefangen haben?
 ‘What did x give as reasons why I had chosen to write?’ R₁
not: ‘(x asked) Why had I chosen to write.’ R₂
 ‘What is evidence that I started to write?’ (“Why is it that some x claims that I started writing?”)

Note that the GRS allows R₂ (the free indirect speech reading), but not R₁. That is again predicted correctly under the assumption of weak reportativity. The GRS does not introduce an independent reportative content that could outscope the interrogative; instead, the interrogative denotation is marked as dependent on a higher attitude operator that can

²⁶The issue is not discussed in Schenner (t.a.).

²⁷Additionally, (57-b) permits a higher construal of a *because*-clause (and thus the trace of a *why*-phrase). The resulting reading R₃ is highly salient for the following naturally occurring examples:

- (i) Warum soll ich plötzlich an Osteoporose erkrankt sein, obwohl ich doch das ganze Leben lang nie mit meinem Skelett Probleme hatte?
 ‘Why should I be suffering from osteoporosis all of a sudden, given that I’ve never had problems with my bones?’
www.bergische-apotheke.de/downloads/journal/journal-2007-06.pdf
- (ii) Warum soll ich schwul sein, nur weil ich gerne tanze?
 ‘Why should I be gay, just because I like dancing?’ (= What reason is there to assume that I’m gay, just because I enjoy dancing?)

Such readings are unavailable for Tagalog *daw* (and also the GRS). Clearly, in contrast to a predicate like *say*, a particle does not itself contain a trace position for a *wh*-element. But most likely, the modal verb does not either. Hence, I would like to argue that *daw* stands in a syntactically higher position than *sollen* and can thus not be outscoped by a *because*-clause.

embed non-declarative complements.

- (58) Warum habe der Angeklagte das Opfer angerufen?
 why haveGRS the defendant the victim called
 *‘What were the reasons x gave for the defendants calling the victim?’ R_1
 ‘(and then x asked) why had the defendant called the victim?’ R_2

Analogously, embedded interrogatives marked with GRS can only get the concord interpretation.

For the strongly reportative elements *daw* and *sollen*, both the difference in matrix interrogatives, as also the difference in embedded interrogatives, is predicted correctly, if we assume with Schenner (t.a.) that *sollen* requires a propositional complement, but adopt a flexible logical type for *daw*: *daw* can combine either with a proposition or with an interrogative denotation (a set of propositions, cf. Karttunen 1977).

7. An Analysis for *daw*

In this last section, I will give a brief sketch of a formal analysis for *daw*.

As I have argued above, a presuppositional analysis seems most promising to account for the volatile behaviour of the reportative meaning component. Moreover, *daw* has turned out to be strongly reportative and thus to introduce a presupposition of the form ‘some x said p ’. Standard assumptions of presupposition satisfaction will then allow us to predict concord, as well as local and global readings.

For *daw* in particular, we also have to take into account (i) the restriction to third person sources,²⁸ (ii) the ability to embed both interrogative and declarative complements.

I assume that *daw* combines with a declarative p_t or an interrogative prejacent $q_{(st,t)}$.²⁹ Brasoveanu and Farkas (2007) argue that verba dicendi introduce event arguments for utterance events. Drawing on their proposal, the presupposition introduced by *daw* can be spelt out as follows:

- (59) there is a particular x and a particular utterance event e such that x is the agent in e and is neither the speaker nor the hearer, the content of e is $\wedge p / \wedge q$

The *at issue*-content is more problematic. If *daw* occurs in a clause that is embedded under an attitude operator, it should be just $\wedge p / \wedge q$ (apart from what happens on the local interpretation, where the reportative information has to “intervene” between the embedding operator and the prejacent). But if *daw* occurs in unembedded position, we do not want it to have the effect an unembedded occurrence of the prejacent might have - namely, that p is asserted or that q is asked.

So, in the unembedded case as well as in the case of local accommodation, *daw* need not make any at issue-contribution; it is the presupposition that turns out to be the

²⁸*sollen* seems to be similar on that account, to my knowledge, this has not been studied in detail yet. The GRS is more liberal: only first person present is normally disallowed, and cf. Fabricius-Hansen and Sæbø (2004) for cases where it is possible after all.

²⁹I assume that imperatives are special modalized propositions, cf. Schwager (2005).

main proposition expressed³⁰ or functions as the complement of an attitude operator. But if *daw* modifies a clause that is embedded under a higher attitude operator, and has its presupposition bound or non-locally accommodated, it is the prejacent $\wedge p/\wedge q$ as such that needs to be passed on as the complement for the attitude operator. In order to achieve this, I will follow Schenner (t.a.)’s analysis for *sollen* and require local informativity. If the resolution of the presupposition is such that *daw* would not have an effect in its local context (e.g. the complement clause, where it occurs), then an optional at-issue value $\wedge p/\wedge q$ is activated as a last resort. (60) is to be understood as a formula of presuppositional DRS, cf. van der Sandt (cf. 1992). The DRSs are displayed in linearized form and carry their presuppositions as a subscripted DRS.³¹

- (60) $daw \rightsquigarrow \lambda K_{t \cdot [x, e, K_2] \text{UTTERANCE}(e), \text{AGENT}(e, x), x \neq \text{speaker}, x \neq \text{hearer}, \text{CONTENT}(e, K_2), K_2 = K}$
 where $\alpha = t$ or $\alpha = \langle st, t \rangle$,
 unless the resolution of the presupposition violates local informativity. If local informativity would be violated, $\wedge K$ is additionally activated as at issue content.

A verbum dicendi like *sabi* ‘say’ is translated as follows:

- (61) $sabi \rightsquigarrow \lambda K_{\langle s, t \rangle} \lambda x. [e \mid \text{UTTERANCE}(e), \text{AGENT}(e, x), \text{CONTENT}(e, K)]$

Hence, if the *daw*-modified clause is embedded under such an attitude operator, thanks to local informativity, its *at issue*-content is of the right logical type to act as the operator’s argument. The presupposition can either be bound to the discourse referents that are introduced by the attitude operator or be accommodated locally or globally (for details of how presuppositions can be resolved, cf. van der Sandt 1992). In the case of local accommodation, the presupposition itself is resolved to constitute the clausal argument of ‘say’.

8. Conclusions and Outlook

In this paper I have given a detailed account of the reportative particle *daw* in Tagalog. I have argued that it is neither an illocutionary marker nor a dynamically modal element, but that it introduces a presupposition that the thus modified content has been the content of a previous utterance event. This presupposition can be bound or accommodated at various levels, which accounts for the different readings that arise. It comes out that *daw* is very similar to the German modal *sollen* (on its reportative reading). An analysis for *daw* is provided in terms of a translation into presuppositional DRT.

From the comparison of various elements across languages, we know that reportative markers differ in terms of the level at which their grammatical impact comes into play. Moreover, we have now seen that the class of presuppositional reportative elements in itself also displays a great amount of variation. But the elements differ according to relatively well-identifiable parameters, in particular, in whether we are dealing with weak or strong reportativity, what restrictions on the person parameter are to be found, and what is

³⁰Even if this is different from what counts as foregrounded information, cf. footnote 3.

³¹UTTERANCE has to be understood coarsely enough so as to allow for embedding under operators like *akala* ‘belief’.

the logical type of the reportative element. Further work needs to be done in order to spell out all the technical details arising from interaction with other operators and especially interrogatives.

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